Air India setting records

@ChemGuy so, if I'm reading this correctly, the possibilities of the article posted by Gino are potentially

1) They never switched the fuel switches from cutoff to on (not sure if there would be enough fuel in the lines to take off though)

Even if there was fuel (there isn’t) there would be no ignition. That switch is an on/off switch. No possibility of it being half on.
2) There may have been an attempt to re-start, based on a loss of thrust (moving the switches from ON to OFF, and then back)
Seriously doubt it.
3) Inadvertent turning off of the switches which seems difficult to believe given the stop lock mechanism (see graphic below from article)
Basically impossible to accidentally flip those switches
4) something else?
Yeah…

ai-171-fuel-switches-graphic-jo.jpeg
 
Given the position of the switches, is it possible to lift the guards and throw both at the same time?
No. The locks require you to pull the switch up before they'll move. They're not hard to toggle, but they require a deliberate action to do so. I would need both hands to do them at the same time.
 

Thanks for the comments. That's helpful.
So far, starting to appear to be human driven & not mechanical.
 
Id say the captain is most likely the one with the muscle memory to do that. I dont know about their operations but my guess is the captain would usually taxi to the gate and shut down the engines.

A jump seater may have done if there was one.
 
From the report:

The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
RAT in extended position
15
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.


Summary:

08:08:42 Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position.
One of the pilots asks the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
08:08:52 Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN
08:08:56 Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN

Bottom line, a human hand in the cockpit physically moved the fuel switches to cutoff, one at a time, an unbelievable action which only happens on the ground- your hands should be nowhere near there and there's nothing on that pedestal that requires intervention during takeoff.

The switches are electric, the high pressure fuel valve on the engine control unit is shut, the spool down of the engine is instantaneous. It would feel like hitting a brick wall to go from high thrust / high climb angle to no thrust. So the pilot flying instantly knew- it took about 1o seconds to get one of the switches back on, followed by the other, which triggers the auto-relight, but they were both below idle at that point so it's 15 or so seconds they didn't have.

Absolutely crazy.
 
From the report:

The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
RAT in extended position
15
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.


Summary:

08:08:42 Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position.
One of the pilots asks the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
08:08:52 Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN
08:08:56 Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN

Bottom line, a human hand in the cockpit physically moved the fuel switches to cutoff, one at a time, an unbelievable action which only happens on the ground- your hands should be nowhere near there and there's nothing on that pedestal that requires intervention during takeoff.

The switches are electric, the high pressure fuel valve on the engine control unit is shut, the spool down of the engine is instantaneous. It would feel like hitting a brick wall to go from high thrust / high climb angle to no thrust. So the pilot flying instantly knew- it took about 1o seconds to get one of the switches back on, followed by the other, which triggers the auto-relight, but they were both below idle at that point so it's 15 or so seconds they didn't have.

Absolutely crazy.
Mostly made sense but I'm naive enough to miss things. Anything in the report an issue with either engine before manual cutout?
 
Well....it's either ridiculously poor training and certification of the crew, or deliberate.
Combined 19,000 of flight time. Doubt they got that way by poor training.

complacency, accident or deliberate is my guess

my father had 3,000 hours. He exerted as much effort flying as he did cutting the grass.

we aren’t talking about new pilots due to DEI hiring. If the news is correct these guys have tons of time
 
One of the YT videos mentions that the pilot probably had his hand guarding/behind the throttle levers. Any way his hand could have slipped and accidentally bumped the cutoff switches even with the guards? Could the guards be slightly off their detent positions??
 
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